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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brian Keith Calderwood appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence.  In the district court, Mr. Calderwood asserted that the officer who detained him lacked
reasonable suspicion.  The district court denied the motion, and Mr. Calderwood entered a
conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance, which preserved
his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On February 18, 2016 at approximately 3:00 a.m., Boise Police Officer Morlock was
dispatched to an auto repair shop at the southeast corner of W. Cassia St. and S. Orchard St. after
a citizen called to report there was a car there with its parking lights on, and a person walking
around.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.3, Ls.6-20; R., pp.69-70.)  The caller refused to give a name, but dispatch
identified the caller’s phone number and address.  (R., p.70.)  Officer Morlock arrived at the
scene two to four minutes after the call but did not see a car or a person at the auto repair shop.
(5/25/16 Tr., p.3, Ls.21-24, p.19, Ls.17-20; R., p.70.)  The only thing he saw in the area was a
male  walking  southbound on  Orchard  St.—heading  towards  the  auto  repair  shop,  on  the  other
side of the street from the shop—approaching the northwest corner of the intersection.  (5/25/16
Tr., p.6, Ls.1-12; R., p.70.)
Officer Morlock said he made eye contact with this man while driving by, but the man
looked away “rather sharply.”  (5/25/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.13-18; R., p.70.)  Officer Morlock then
turned his vehicle around and started to get out of his car, but before he could do so, the man ran
onto a church lawn at the southwest corner of the intersection.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.7, L.11 - p.8, L.5;
R., pp.70-71.)  Officer Morlock said the man then ran clockwise around the church while digging
2into his pockets.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.8, L.7 – p.9, L.9; R., p.71.)  Officer Morlock followed in his
car—driving on the sidewalk and grass of the church—but he did not turn on his emergency
lights or spotlight, and he did not see the man take anything out of his pockets.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.8,
L.18 – p.9, L.11, p.30, Ls.3-8; R., p.71.)  The man circled the building once, then went onto
Cassia St, stopped, put his hands over his head and faced Officer Morlock, who was still in his
vehicle.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.9, Ls.12-18; R., p.71.)  At that point, the man started to walk towards
Officer Morlock, and Officer Morlock exited his vehicle and told the man to get on his knees.
(5/25/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-7; R., p.71.)  The man complied, and Officer Morlock handcuffed him.
(R., p.71.)  Officer Morlock asked him why he was running, and he said he was trying to get rid
of drug paraphernalia.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-19; R., p.71.)  Officer Morlock asked if he had
more paraphernalia or drugs.  (R., p.71.)  The man confirmed that he did, and Officer Morlock
took a syringe from him.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-6; R., p.71.)  Once the man was in the car,
Officer Morlock also took another syringe and a vial from the man’s pocket.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.22,
Ls.6-13; R., p.71.)
Officer Morlock asked for the man’s name, and the man said he was Brian Calderwood;
Officer Morlock discovered shortly thereafter that Mr. Calderwood had active warrants.
(5/25/16 Tr., p.11, L.9 – p.12, L.11; R., p.72.)  Another officer came to the scene and found
“drug related items” in the street where Officer Morlock had first made contact with
Mr. Calderwood and around the perimeter of the church.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.13, L.19 – p.14, L.8,
p.22, Ls.15-25; R., p.71.)
Mr. Calderwood was initially charged with possession of a controlled substance and
possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp.22-23.)  He filed a motion to suppress evidence in which he
argued that Officer Morlock did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him.  (R., pp.39-46.)
3Subsequently, the State filed an Information Part II, which charged Mr. Calderwood with a
persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp.65-66.)  At the hearing on the suppression motion,
Mr. Calderwood conceded that he was not detained until Officer Morlock told him to get on his
knees; the district court held that Officer Morlock had reasonable suspicion to detain
Mr. Calderwood at that point and denied the motion to suppress.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.37, Ls.15-23;
R., pp.69-80.)  Subsequently, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Calderwood entered a
conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance, and the State agreed
to dismiss the paraphernalia charge and the Information Part II.  (7/20/16 Tr., p.3, Ls.14-23, p.7,
Ls.18-23; R., p.98.)  Noting that Mr. Calderwood was on parole in another case, the district court
imposed a sentence of seven years, with zero years fixed.  (9/14/16 Tr., p.27, L.15, p.29, L.12;
R.,  pp.93-95.)   Thereafter,  Mr.  Calderwood  filed  a  Notice  of  Appeal  timely  from  the  district
court’s judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.103-04.)
4ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Calderwood’s motion to suppress because Officer
Morlock lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him?
5ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Calderwood’s Motion To Suppress Because
Officer Morlock Lacked Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Him
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1 Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const.
art. 1, § 17.  The purpose of this constitutional right is to “impose a standard of reasonableness
upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual’s
privacy and security against arbitrary invasions.” State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App.
2002).  Searches or detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129
(Ct. App. 2002).  The exclusionary rule applies to suppress evidence that is the fruit of illegal
governmental activity. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge,
117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990).  Suppression is required if “the evidence sought to be suppressed
would not have come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct.” State v.
Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005).
“Typically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable.” State v. Bishop,
146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (citation omitted).  “However, limited investigatory detentions, based
on  less  than  probable  cause,  are  permissible  when  justified  by  an
officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that  a  person  has  committed,  or  is  about  to  commit,  a
crime.” Id.  “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts” and “requires more than a mere hunch . . . .” Id.
(citations omitted).  The determination of whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion at
the time of a detention is “evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the
6officer at or before the time of the stop.” Id.  (citations omitted.)  “An appellate court evaluates
the validity of the stop by looking at the totality of the circumstances and then determines
whether the detaining officer had a particularized objective basis for suspecting the particular
person of criminal activity.” State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 847 (2000) (citation omitted).
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
which were supported by substantial evidence but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996).
In this case, Officer Morlock did not possess reasonable suspicion that Mr. Calderwood
had committed or was about to commit a crime.  The district court summed up the totality of the
circumstances as follows:  “The encounter occurred well after midnight, prompted by a call from
a concerned citizen.  Calderwood was located at the place where the suspicious activity was
reported, and then . . . ran from the officer.”  (R., p.79.)  Based on these facts, the district court
held that Officer Morlock had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Calderwood when
Mr. Calderwood put his hands up and walked towards him.  (R., p.79.)  The district court erred.
The fact that the stop occurred after midnight should not have contributed to the district
court’s holding.  In State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 (Ct. App. 1991), the court held that, “the
fact that the stop occurred in the early morning hours does not enhance the suspicious nature of
the observation.”  And the Idaho Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed its statement in Emory.
State v. Neal, 367 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct. App. 2016) (“time of day is of little significance in
determining reasonable suspicion”); Cf. Padilla v. State, 389 P.3d 169, 172 (2016) (holding that
law enforcement possessed reasonable suspicion and considering that defendant’s flight was at
2:00 a.m.).
7The district  court  also  failed  to  consider  the  fact  that  the  caller  refused  to  give  a  name
when calling in the tip. “An anonymous tip standing alone is generally not enough to justify a
stop because an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or
veracity.” State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101 (Ct. App. 2000).  But the information from
an anonymous tip “may contribute to the necessary reasonable suspicion when coupled with the
officer’s own corroboration of significant details  of the tip.” Hankey, 134 Idaho at 847 (citing
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 326 (1990)).
Here, the tip was anonymous, and the fact that dispatch identified the caller’s phone
number and address did not prove the caller’s basis of knowledge of the veracity of the
statement.  (R., p.69.)  Further, the caller reported a car and a person walking around at the auto
repair shop, but Officer Morlock could not corroborate that information.  When he arrived at the
auto repair shop two to four minutes later, nobody was there. (5/25/16 Tr., p.3, Ls.21-24, p.19,
Ls.17-20; R., p.70.)  Therefore, since the tip had no “indicia of reliability,” and it was not
corroborated, the district court should have given it no weight in evaluating the totality of the
circumstances. See Hankey, 134 Idaho at 847.
Additionally, the district court’s finding that Mr. Calderwood was “at the place where the
suspicious activity occurred” was not supported by substantial evidence.  (R., p.79.)  The district
court acknowledged earlier in its order that Mr. Calderwood was only “in the vicinity” of the
auto repair shop.  (R., p.78.)  When Officer Morlock arrived at the scene, Mr. Calderwood was
on the other side of the street from the auto repair shop, walking towards the intersection where
the shop was located; he was not walking or running away from the shop, and there was no
indication that he had been at the shop.  (5/25/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-12; R., p.70.)
8As such, the only suspicious thing Mr. Calderwood did was run away while digging in
his pockets. (5/25/16 Tr., p.8, L.7 – p.9, L.9.)  And flight from law enforcement does not
necessarily establish reasonable suspicion.  In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), the State
of Illinois asked the United States Supreme Court to adopt a “bright-line rule” holding that flight
from law enforcement establishes reasonable suspicion. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).  The Court refused to do so.  It held,
Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not
necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. In
reviewing  the  propriety  of  an  officer's  conduct,  courts  do  not  have  available
empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we
cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement
officers where none exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must
be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.
Id. at 125-26 (citation omitted).
Mr. Wardlow fled when he saw officers patrolling in an “area known for heavy narcotics
trafficking.” Id. at 121.  The Court noted that a person’s “presence in an area of expected
criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized
suspicion that the person is committing a crime,” but held that because Mr. Wardlow was in
that area and then fled when he noticed the police, law enforcement was “justified in
suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity . . . .” Id. at 124-25.
In this case, Mr. Calderwood was not in a high-crime area.  He did look away when
Officer Morlock made eye contact with him, but this was not inherently suspicious.  Indeed,
in Wardlow the State of Illinois conceded that, “an innocent person—even one distrustful of
the police—might ‘avoid eye contact or even sneer at the sight of an officer,’ and that would
not justify a Terry stop or any sort of per se inference.” Id. at 130-31 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
9Thus, the only suspicious thing Officer Morlock saw Mr. Calderwood do was run
away while sticking his hands in his pockets.  After that, he put his hands up and walked
towards Officer Morlock. At that point, the totality of the circumstances did not create
reasonable suspicion for Officer Morlock to detain Mr. Calderwood.  Therefore, the district
court erred when it denied Mr. Calderwood’s motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Calderwood respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order that denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 21st day of June, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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